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Abstract
I analyse how ageing affects the demand for non-housing durable goods. Based
on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, individual characteristics, cohort and
time effects can explain most of the age variation in the ownership and purchase of
durable goods. A life-cycle model is derived to capture the complex relation between
ageing and the demand for non-housing durable goods. Decreasing survival probability,
deteriorating health and changing preferences are jointly reflected in the age gradient
of demand. Simulations indicate that higher chances of survival increase the ownership
ratio of the durable items.
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1 Introduction
I analyse the effect of ageing on the demand for non-housing durable goods (henceforth
durable goods). One would expect that as people get older, they invest less in durable goods
since they have shorter remaining lifetime to enjoy the use value of these goods. However,
this relation is not trivial; the shorter remaining lifetime might make the investment in
durable goods less desirable. However, the utility derived from some durable goods might
increase with age due to longer hours spent at home. Empirical evidence indeed suggests
that the demand for some durable goods (e.g. televisions) is increasing with age. Unlike
in the case of housing, decisions on non-housing durable good ownership is made regularly,
but unlike in the case of non-durable consumption, the decision still has consequences for
future utilities derived from the good. Thus, the trade-off implied by higher use value versus
shorter remaining lifetime is more relevant in the case of non-housing durable goods than
housing durable goods or non-durable consumption. In addition, increasing longevity can
have a different effect on the demand for different types of durable goods. I discuss these
differences in details in this paper.
With increasing expected lifetime, the expenditures of older people have a rising share in
aggregate household expenditures. According to UK statistics (Office for National Statistics (2010)),
total household expenditures decrease with age above age 30, but the share of expenditures
on household goods and services within total expenditures increases with age. The aggre-
gate share of these expenditures was 6.4% in 2008, but higher for older age groups: 7.4%
at age 65-74 and 8.1% at age 75 and above. Focusing on ownership, my aims in this paper
are to understand better the age pattern of the ownership of durable goods at age 50 and
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above, and to investigate how increasing longevity affects ownership. The results extend our
knowledge not only to the demand for non-housing durable goods, but also to a study of the
welfare of people at older ages.
I will provide descriptive evidence for the age pattern of durable ownership using the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. This survey hence presents rich information on the
ownership and purchases of and expenditures on durable goods. The age coverage of the
sample (age 50 and above) makes it possible to focus on the effects of ageing. Although
some of the analysed goods have very high (above 80%) ownership rates, the age patterns of
ownership and purchases still differ across different categories of durable goods. In particular,
there are striking differences in the age patterns of ownership of goods that are leisure
complements and require little technical knowledge (e.g. televisions) and goods whose use
require good mental and physical health (e.g. computers).
To understand the complex relations between ageing and the demand for durables, the-
oretical analysis and simulations are needed. Decreasing survival probabilities, declining
health and changing preferences are all different aspects of the ageing process, influencing
the demand for durables. I develop a life-cycle model which takes into account that durable
good ownership is a binary choice. I allow ownership to change every 10 years. The model is
based on an uncertain lifetime, taking into account interactions between durable good own-
ership and non-durable consumption. Hence, it allows the utility weight of durable goods to
depend on health and age.
Simulation exercises are then applied to illustrate the model’s results. When possible, the
simulations are based on standard parameter values from the literature. I will analyse the
influence of discounting, health, and of changing longevity on two types of durable goods;
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namely, televisions and computers. In the Appendix, I will also look at the effects of bequest
motives and retirement.
The results indicate that, conditional on the constant annual income (hence spending
power) of elderly people, with population ageing we should expect to see increasing demand
for non-housing durable goods. This is partly due to increasing longevity and partly due
to the higher utility attached to some types of durable items at older ages. Notably, such
items are goods that are leisure complements, where the use of which does not require good
mental or physical health.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I review the related literature in section 2.
Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis, followed by empirical evidence of
the effects of ageing in section 4. The life-cycle model and simulation results are presented
in section 5. Section 6 then concludes the study.
2 Related literature
Compared to the rich literature available on the consumption of non-durable goods over the
life-cycle and on housing demand, the literature on the demand for non-housing durable
goods is relatively meagre, despite their non-negligible share within total household expen-
ditures. The current paper helps fill this gap, focusing on how the ageing of populations
affects the demand for non-housing durable goods.
The papers with the closest relation to the current analysis are the ones that look at
consumption; in particular, durable goods demand over the life-cycle. Many of the seminal
papers that present life-cycle models do not investigate the demand for durable goods. The
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ones that look at the demand for durable goods generally focus on expenditures, whereas
my focus is on ownership. While expenditures are important for the household budget,
it is ownership and the consumption service flow following from it that provide utility.
In this sense, my analysis complements the existing literature. For example, apart from
performing a robustness check, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) make no distinction between
durables and non-durables in their analysis of consumption over the life-cycle. Yang (2009),
although analysing the different age pattern of housing and non-housing consumption, does
not analyse separately the consumption of non-housing durable goods. Based on U.S. data,
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) document that both durable and non-durable ex-
penditures are humped-shaped over the life-cycle. A similar descriptive analysis is provided
by Alessie and de Ree (2009) based on Dutch data, which also shows a humped-shaped pat-
tern of durable consumption.
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) present a dynamic general equilibrium model
to explain the life-cycle pattern of durable and non-durable consumption. In their model,
durables provide consumption services and act as collateral for loans. In this paper I present
a simpler model than Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) in the sense that I only con-
sider the utility maximisation problem of the individual (household). However, I model the
individual’s problem in more detail, bringing it closer to real life problems. Among other
elements, I allow health to enter the utility function and to affect the marginal utility of
consumption and survival probability at the same time. I also include bequest motives in
the model. To the best of my knowledge, the paper by Browning et al. (2014) is the only
one to analyse the demand for durable goods based on British data. Based on the British
Household Panel Survey, they find that the demand for consumer electronics rises with age,
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while the demand for household appliances is flat. Using an alternative data source and dif-
ferent empirical strategy, my empirical findings on the age pattern of durable goods demand
are somewhat different, as discussed in section 4. Moreover, the life-cycle model and the
following simulations I present and, in particular, my focus on durable good ownership and
its relation to survival probabilities are also novel in the literature.
Apart from the papers cited above, some other strands of the literature also investigate
certain aspects of the demand for durable goods. Although related in topic, these papers
have less direct relevance for the analysis presented in this paper.
The ”early” papers from the 1960s and 70s (Wu (1965), Hamburger (1967), Juster and
Wachtel (1974), among others) provide the first models of demand for household durable
goods, with a focus on durable good expenditures. While my paper contributes to the
understanding of the microeconomic aspect of the demand for durable goods, another set
of related studies consists of papers that derive macroeconomic models with durable goods
(Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), Lastrapes and Potts (2006), Monacelli (2009), among others).
Other papers look at the dynamics of consumer demand for narrow categories of durable
goods. For example, Melnikov (2013) analyses the U.S. computer printer market, while
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) investigate demand in the digital camcorder market. In
this paper, I focus on age patterns in the demand for certain groups of durable goods, but I
do not aim to provide a market analysis or to investigate the choice between differentiated
products within a certain category of durables.
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3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), waves
1-6.1 The ELSA is a biannual panel data set, covering a representative sample of the English
population aged 50 and over and their spouses. The first survey wave was conducted in 2002-
2003. Apart from providing information on a rich set of socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, the ELSA also includes variables related to the ownership and purchase of
various durable goods. Here I exclude individuals living in institutions (0.4% of the sample)
and those who do not own the property they live at (18% of the sample). The only reason
why I analyse homeowners is because in rented properties some durable items (especially the
washing machine) might be provided with the property. Thus, the lack of durable ownership
might in fact reflect the lack of housing ownership. The age coverage of the survey ensures
an appropriate sample size to analyse the effect of ageing on the demand for durable goods.
The remaining sample size per wave varies between 7,700-9,700.
Twelve categories of household durable goods are covered by the ELSA. Each wave is
asked if the household owns the durable good in question, if the household has purchased
such an item in the last two years, and if yes, how much has the household spent on that
item. Here I focus on the ownership and purchases of the durable items, rather than on
the expenditures. Ownership and purchase dummies are less subject to measurement errors
and are not distorted by the huge price variation of the available durable items. Instead of
1The data was made available through the UK Data Archive (UKDA). ELSA was developed by a team
of researchers based at the NatCen Social Research, University College London and the Institute for Fiscal
Studies. The data was collected by NatCen Social Research. The funding is provided by the National
Institute of Aging in the United States, and a consortium of UK government departments co-ordinated by
the Office for National Statistics. The developers and funders of ELSA and the Archive do not bear any
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
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analysing all categories of durable goods, I have selected three considerably different, widely-
used items that I focus on throughout the paper. The first is television (TV) - a leisure good.
The second durable good is the washing machine (WM) - a household appliance. The third
durable good that I analyse is the computer (PC) - an item requiring a high level of technical
knowledge. Appendix A provides graphical results for the other durable good categories.
Figure 1 shows the ownership of the three representative durable goods over age. This
graph does not differentiate age and cohort effects. Moreover, it does not capture the in-
fluence of other individual characteristics. The graph shows three different age patterns for
the ownership of the three categories of durable goods. The television ownership rate is
already high by the age of 50 years, further increasing until age 90.2 The ownership rate of
washing machines is hump-shaped over the age of 50-90 years, with a decline after age 80.
The ownership rate of computers declines steadily above age 50, although between the ages
of 50-60 year the decline is moderate.
Since the ownership rates of televisions and washing machines are particularly high, one
might wonder if the subgroup of individuals not owning the good is a very specific selected
sample. In Table 1, I provide some descriptive evidence that, despite the owner and non-
owner groups are different, these differences look reasonable and the average characteristics
of the non-owner groups are not extraordinary. In section 4, I estimate the determinants of
ownership and purchases by regression analysis, using an extended set of control variables.
The generation of the subjective survival probability indicator is also explained there.
2As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the eligibility for free TV license above age 75 could partly
drive the increasing demand for TV at older ages. However, the graphical analysis does not indicate that
the demand would start rising after the 75-year cut-off point. In addition, extending the regression analysis
with a binary indicator of being aged above 75 years does not support the idea that a free TV licence would
have a significant positive effect on TV ownership or purchases.
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Figure 1: Durable good ownership ratio by age: local polynomial estimator and 95% confi-
dence interval
secondary higher 10-year subjective
age female employed retired education education survival prob
TV ownership
no mean 61.730 0.494 0.506 0.394 0.512 0.267 0.882
std dev 7.688 0.500 0.500 0.489 0.500 0.443 0.175
yes mean 65.773 0.546 0.343 0.537 0.449 0.162 0.766
std dev 9.572 0.498 0.475 0.499 0.497 0.368 0.254
WM ownership
no mean 63.883 0.515 0.434 0.462 0.488 0.240 0.832
std dev 9.278 0.500 0.496 0.499 0.500 0.427 0.227
yes mean 65.566 0.545 0.349 0.531 0.451 0.162 0.770
std dev 9.473 0.498 0.477 0.499 0.498 0.368 0.251
PC ownsership
no mean 68.355 0.568 0.261 0.613 0.404 0.108 0.714
std dev 9.967 0.495 0.439 0.487 0.491 0.310 0.284
yes mean 63.116 0.521 0.435 0.454 0.494 0.221 0.826
std dev 8.429 0.500 0.496 0.498 0.500 0.415 0.208
Table 1: Comparison of the owners and non-owners of the analysed durable goods
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Figure 2: Fraction of respondents purchasing durable items the previous 2 years by age:
local polynomial estimator and 95% confidence interval
As Figure 2 indicates, there is less variation in the purchase ratios throughout the
analysed age interval than in ownership ratios. A slight hump-shaped pattern can be ob-
served for television purchases with a peak around the age of 60-65 years. Computer and
washing machine purchase probabilities tend to decline with age, the slope being slightly
steeper for computers. The decreasing age pattern of purchases above age 50 is in line with
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) and Browning et al. (2014), despite the fact that
their analyses cannot reveal the different age pattern of television purchases. Moreover, they
do not analyse the age pattern of durable ownership.
For the sake of comparison, in Figure 3 I present the age pattern of the average expen-
ditures on the three representative durable goods. The expenditures are set to zero if no
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Figure 3: Expenditures on the durable items the previous 2 years by age, in GBP: local
polynomial estimator and 95% confidence interval
purchase has taken place the previous 2 years.3 As expected, the age pattern of the expen-
ditures resembles the age pattern of the purchase ratios. The differences between the three
categories reflect not only the different purchase ratios but also the differences in average
price, which is the lowest for washing machine (313 GBP), the highest for computers (607
GBP) and the price of televisions lies in between (550 GBP).4
3I use only those answers where an exact value of expenditures is reported. I do not use bracket values.
For all three durable goods, the exact value is missing only for around 5% of the observed purchases.
4The actual price of a durable item cannot be observed in the data. The ”price” statistics reported here
reflect the average reported expenditures for those who report positive expenditures. Thus, I assume that a
respondent purchased a maximum of one item of the durable good within the two-year period.
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4 Empirical evidence
In this section, I present the age pattern of the demand for durable goods, cleaning the
demand from cohort and wave effects and from the effects of other individual character-
istics. The aim is to analyse any residual effect of ageing and survival probability on
the demand for durables. This empirical analysis is similar to Browning et al. (2014) and
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), although I analyse different outcome variables.
Thus, I focus on ownership and purchase indicators instead of expenditures and I analyse
three narrow categories of durable goods, as described in section 3.
The relation of the ownership and purchase probabilities to individual characteristics is
presented in Table 2. The average marginal effects presented are based on pooled probit
models. I check them for age (using age dummies), time (wave) to capture aggregate price
shocks or technical innovations and for cohorts (10-year birth intervals) to capture technical
knowledge or cohort-specific preferences. The use of 10-year intervals to capture cohort
effects is a simple but intuitive way to get around the linear interdependency of time, age and
cohorts. Since age equals time minus birth year (cohort), the model would not be identified
if all three variables were continuous measures. This is a well-known identification problem
in the literature (Heckman and Robb (1985), McKenzie (2006), among others), while the
results can be sensitive to the specification choice. Strong age effects are to be expected due
to changing preferences with age, while time effects are important (and indeed statistically
significant) because of price and other aggregate effects. Hence, I assume here that the
knowledge or preferences captured by the cohort effects do not change continuously with
time. With this specification, the estimated age effect shows the effect of age relative to the
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base age (age 50), within a given cohort at a given year. The main drawback of this empirical
approach is that some of the estimated age effects might, in fact, be cohort effects within the
10-year cohort groups. The other explanatory variables included are gender, education level,
the quintiles of net financial wealth and equivalised income, indicators of employment and
marital status, existence of children, household size, living area (government office regions),
whether the respondent reports any difficulties with the activities of daily living (ADL) and
instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), and finally, an indicator of subjective survival
probability, which is based on a question asking about the chances of living until a target age,
where the target age is around 10 years higher than the age of the respondent.5 Since age
and cohort are controlled for, the estimated effect of subjective survival probability captures
the effect of the deviation of the subjective expectations from the statistical (life-table)
probabilities.
As for ownership, the estimates reveal that a higher socioeconomic status increases the
probability of computer ownership, while decreasing the probability of television ownership.
The estimated marginal effects for washing machine ownership tend to be in the middle of the
results for television and computer ownership. As for purchases, there are more similarities
5Here I generate the 10-year subjective survival probability measure following the hazard scaling approach
of Gan et al. (2005). First, I calculate the individual specific index of pessimism (η) which is the ratio
between the logarithm of the reported survival probability (s) and the life table survival probability (S)
from the current age (t) to the target age (t+ a):
ηi =
ln st+ait
lnSt+at
.
I will use the gender specific period life table for year 2004-2006 as provided by the Office for National
Statistics (2014). To avoid missing values due to the logarithmic function, if s = 0 then I replace the
reported zero probability with 1% survival probability. The 10-year subjective survival probability is then
calculated as
st+10it =
(
St+10t
)ηi .
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Ownership Purchase
TV WM PC TV WM PC
female 0.0129*** 0.00986** -0.0119* -0.0131*** -0.00225 -0.0134***
[0.00397] [0.00498] [0.00708] [0.00429] [0.00312] [0.00359]
net fin wealth, 2nd quintile 0.00237 0.00305 -0.0217** 0.0222*** 0.000482 -0.00397
[0.00606] [0.00745] [0.00971] [0.00748] [0.00575] [0.00613]
net fin wealth, 3rd quintile -0.000788 0.00756 0.00572 0.0284*** 0.00162 0.00326
[0.00610] [0.00741] [0.00979] [0.00727] [0.00543] [0.00594]
net fin wealth, 4th quintile -0.00935 -0.00170 0.0254** 0.0511*** 0.000287 0.0222***
[0.00625] [0.00753] [0.0100] [0.00730] [0.00539] [0.00603]
net fin wealth, 5th quintile -0.00996 0.00857 0.0491*** 0.0444*** -0.00494 0.0385***
[0.00632] [0.00762] [0.0106] [0.00757] [0.00551] [0.00623]
income, 2nd quintile 0.00596 0.0172*** 0.0456*** 0.0203*** 0.00245 0.0212***
[0.00525] [0.00663] [0.00920] [0.00712] [0.00511] [0.00583]
income, 3rd quintile -0.00716 0.00206 0.0827*** 0.0341*** 0.00686 0.0331***
[0.00519] [0.00677] [0.00962] [0.00706] [0.00500] [0.00573]
income, 4th quintile -0.0329*** -0.0210*** 0.100*** 0.0436*** 0.0143*** 0.0486***
[0.00563] [0.00702] [0.00983] [0.00718] [0.00514] [0.00571]
income, 5th quintile -0.0647*** -0.0556*** 0.0908*** 0.0589*** 0.0221*** 0.0561***
[0.00617] [0.00764] [0.0104] [0.00760] [0.00557] [0.00597]
employed 0.0167*** 0.0132* -0.00788 0.00563 0.00928* 0.000981
[0.00612] [0.00759] [0.0103] [0.00787] [0.00560] [0.00640]
retired 0.00526 0.00204 6.69e-05 0.00885 0.00998* 0.000169
[0.00585] [0.00690] [0.00922] [0.00737] [0.00542] [0.00622]
married 0.00248 0.0243*** 0.0377*** 0.00960* 0.00403 0.000670
[0.00453] [0.00565] [0.00802] [0.00522] [0.00383] [0.00428]
widow 0.0280*** -0.00144 0.0112 -0.0128 0.00673 -0.0129*
[0.00781] [0.00773] [0.0101] [0.00786] [0.00582] [0.00678]
has child -0.0271*** 0.00411 0.0179* 0.00278 0.0176*** -0.00501
[0.00648] [0.00778] [0.0101] [0.00649] [0.00493] [0.00525]
household size -0.0240*** -0.0173*** 0.0500*** 0.0186*** 0.0154*** 0.0193***
[0.00230] [0.00286] [0.00461] [0.00296] [0.00204] [0.00231]
secondary edu -0.0280*** -0.0271*** 0.132*** -0.0150*** -0.00471 0.0315***
[0.00551] [0.00642] [0.00832] [0.00539] [0.00395] [0.00497]
higher edu -0.0381*** -0.0462*** 0.207*** -0.0385*** -0.0120** 0.0582***
[0.00659] [0.00800] [0.0110] [0.00701] [0.00519] [0.00587]
other edu -0.0152** -0.0151* 0.121*** -0.00862 0.00443 0.0361***
[0.00739] [0.00869] [0.0121] [0.00769] [0.00550] [0.00688]
10-yr survival -0.00879 -0.0119 0.0618*** 0.00349 -0.00526 0.0275**
proability (0 to 1) [0.0115] [0.0122] [0.0154] [0.0116] [0.00888] [0.0111]
ADL 0.0123** 0.00850 0.00636 0.00177 0.000579 0.000683
[0.00539] [0.00628] [0.00833] [0.00644] [0.00479] [0.00565]
IADL 0.00325 0.00732 -0.0265*** 0.0124* 0.00396 0.000716
[0.00544] [0.00647] [0.00816] [0.00661] [0.00498] [0.00579]
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
10-yr cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,055 43,055 43,055 42,392 42,392 42,392
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at individual level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Average marginal effects based on probit models of durable goods ownership and
purchase
between the three durable goods: being female has a negative effect, good financial circum-
stances, while being married and household size have a positive effect. Both secondary and
higher education have a positive effect only on the probability of buying a computer. Higher
14
subjective survival probability has a positive effect on the probability of owning and buying
a computer, ceteris paribus. At the same time, it has a weakly significant negative effect
on the ownership probability of washing machine. The opposite sign of the marginal effects
on ownership and purchases does not necessarily imply a contradiction as ownership can
result from purchases before the observation period or also from gifts. Replacing a durable
good implies purchases while keeping ownership unchanged. In the model of section 5, the
relationship between ownership and purchases will be captured in a simplified way. Due to
depreciation, durable ownership can remain unchanged after a 10-year period but only if a
replacement is made.
The figures 4 and 5 show the estimated marginal effects of the age dummies, conditional
on individual characteristics, time, region and 10-year cohort effects.
The partial effect of age on the probability of durable ownership (Figure 4) is different
from the total age effect (Figure 1). After eliminating the cohort and time effects and
the effects of other individual characteristics, age has a smaller residual effect on durable
ownership than the simple descriptive figures suggest. This is particularly true for computer
ownership, although a similar effect holds for durable purchases (comparing Figures 2 and
5). We can observe some statistically significant positive age effects at the oldest ages in
the case of television ownership. Moreover, there is a statistically significant negative age
effect around age 60-70 on the ownership of washing machines and above around age 55 on
computers. Above age 50 we can observe a U-shaped pattern in the age effect on washing
machine ownership, but only a small part of these relations is statistically significant. Overall,
the age pattern of washing machine ownership is in-between the pattern of television and
computer ownership.
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Figure 5: Average marginal effect and 95% confidence interval of age on durable good pur-
chases
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The partial effect of age on the probability of purchasing a durable good (Figure 5) is
mostly statistically insignificant, although above age 70 we can see a negative age effect on
the purchases of all three goods. Statistically, the strongest effect of age on durable good
purchases is the negative effect of older ages on the probability of buying a computer. The age
pattern of residual durable purchases is different from the results of Browning et al. (2014),
who find a positively sloped age profile of durable expenditures for older ages once the cohort
effects are taken into account. Differences in both the empirical specification and the data
used can then contribute to the differing findings.
Overall, Figures 4 and 5 indicate that the individual observable characteristics and time
effects can explain most of the age variation of durables ownership and purchases. The
remaining age variation is relatively small, the strongest age effects can be observed for
television (positive effects of higher ages) and computer ownership and purchases (negative
effects of higher ages).
In turn, reduced form estimation techniques cannot reveal the underlying mechanisms
that shape the age profiles of durable ownership and purchases, as presented in Figures 1
and 2. Therefore, in the next part of the paper I analyse the demand for durable goods in
the framework of a life-cycle model.
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5 Life-cycle model
5.1 Baseline model specification
Here I derive a discrete time life-cycle model in which utility depends on durable good
ownership, non-durable consumption and health, and in which lifetime is uncertain. I only
consider the utility maximisation problem of the individual, while the supply of goods is
exogenous. This is a neoclassical model with no transaction costs. The aim of the modelling
exercise is to obtain an understanding of the influencing mechanisms of age and survival
probability on the demand for durable goods. I aim for simplicity and transparency but at
the expense of it being possible to exactly match the model with the data. The model can
only be solved numerically. In Appendix B I present a simpler 2-period model which has an
analytical solution.
The benchmark model is specified as follows. There is one type of durable good. Individ-
uals have maximum 50 years of remaining lifetime. They maximise their expected lifetime
utility with decision variables of non-durable consumption and investment into a durable
good. However, to keep the numerical solution of the model tractable, I assume that a deci-
sion on the investment into the durable good and on non-durable consumption is only made
every 10 years. In the years when no decision is made on investment into the durable good
(i.e. years 1-9, 11-19, etc), non-durable consumption equals income.6 The maximisation
6While the 10-year frequency of decisions might seem too restrictive, it might be reasonable for the
population analysed. For older generations, it is less likely they will replace the durable goods unless a more
advanced version is available. Owing to attrition and access to only 6 waves of the data, it is impossible
to determine the frequency of purchases empirically. Between 10-25% of the respondents buy the analysed
durable goods each wave (i.e. every two years). This trend may be in line with an average of 10-year
frequency of purchase decisions. The depreciation guide of United Policyholders (2016) indicates 12 useful
years of colour televisions, 8 useful years of automatic washers and 4 useful years of personal computers. The
simulations demonstrate how people will decide if they can gain access to the durable good only every 10
years. Simulating the model by assuming more frequent decisions is also restricted by computational time.
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problem is:
max
5∑
t=1
δ10t [s10t+50 (H10t+50)u (C10t+50, D10t+50, H10t+50|t) + (1− s10t+50 (H10t+50)) v (W10t+50)] ,
(1)
where t denotes decades, C is non-durable consumption, D is the ownership of the durable
good (0 or 1), H is health, W is wealth, δ is the discount factor, and sτ is the probability of
survival to age τ , conditional on survival to age 50. The function u(.) is the current utility
of consumption, durable good ownership and health, function v(.) is the utility of bequests.
Durable good ownership increases utility due to the consumption service flow provided by
the durable good. The maximisation is subject to the following conditions:
H10t = H10(t−1)ξ
10 (2)
W10t = R
10W10(t−1) − C10t − pD10t + Y10t (3)
C10t > 0,W10t > 0 (4)
While variable D indicates the ownership of the durable good, it is assumed that by the
end of each 10-year period the durable good breaks down with probability one and needs to
be replaced if the decision-maker wishes to continue owning a durable good. According to
equation (2), health is deterministic, depreciating with an annual rate of ξ. This is a simple
way to capture that health tends to decline with age. Equation (3) specifies the dynamics
of wealth, where R is one plus the annual interest rate, p is the price of the durable good
(non-durable consumption is the numeraire) and Y is annual income. Income is assumed
to be constant in the baseline specification, but it is allowed to drop after retirement under
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the simulations of section 6. There is no credit in this model, entailing that wealth cannot
be negative. I neglect income uncertainty and the decreasing trend in the relative prices
of durable goods (as reported by Browning et al. (2014)). These assumptions are made to
keep the model as simple as possible and to allow me to focus on the effect of ageing through
survival probability, health and changing preferences.
The utility function is specified as:
u (C10t, D10t, H10t|t) = f (C10t, D10t, H10t|t)
1−γ
1− γ , where (5a)
f (C10t, D10t, H10t|t) =
[
1 + α10tC
φ−1
φ
10t + (1− α10t)D10t
] φ
1−φ
+ ηH10t, (5b)
α10t = max (0,min (1, α1 + α2H10t + α310t+ 0.1)) . (5c)
Parameter γ captures the relative risk aversion, and φ the elasticity of substitution. The
utility function of Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) is similar, although they do not
include health and use constant α. I allow the utility weight of the non-durable and durable
goods to depend on health and age (captured by t), and on a random element , which is
assumed to follow standard normal distribution. In an extension of the model in Appendix
C, I also allow the utility weight to depend on retirement status. In the baseline model, I
assume that the utility weight of non-durable consumption increases with health whereas
that of the durable good decreases with it. This assumption is based on the consideration
that, with deteriorating health, people tend to spend more time at home thus attaching
higher utility to the durable goods. I check the sensitivity of the results to this assumption
in section 5.2.2. Apart from this multiplicative effect, health also has a direct effect on
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utility through the additional ηH term. This specification is similar to the one used by
Finkelstein et al. (2013). The utility of bequests has the same parameter of risk aversion:
v (W10t) = β
W 1−γ10t
1− γ . (6)
β is an indicator of the strength of bequest motives. A similar specification is used e.g. by
Cocco et al. (2005). The probability of survival conditional on living up to age 50 is defined
based on a modified Gompertz-Makeham law.7 The modification compared to the standard
Gompertz-Makeham law is that health is allowed to influence the baseline mortality:
s10t+50 (H10t+50) =
exp
[
−ω1−ω2(H10t+50−0.5)
ω3
(exp (ω3 (10t+ 50)− 1)− ω0 (10t+ 50))
]
exp
[
−ω1−ω2(H50−0.5)
ω3
(exp (50ω3 − 1)− 50ω0)
] . (7)
Table 3 presents the parameter values I use in the baseline specification. If possible, I use
standard parameter values from the literature.
Table 4 shows the solution of the baseline specification.8 At this stage my aim is only
to present a baseline solution, as further analysis and reference to the three representative
durable goods are provided in section 5.2.3. The model is not calibrated to match the
observed age-pattern of durable good ownership and purchases quantitatively. Instead , the
aim is to illustrate the model’s implications using reasonable parameter values. The model’s
solutions can still be compared to the observed age-pattern of durable good ownership.
7For details on the Gompertz-Makeham law and other widely used mortality models, see e.g.
Pletcher et al. (2000).
8The model is solved numerically with the GAUSS 13 software. The solution procedure is the following.
A random  is drawn. Conditional on this , the optimal non-durable consumption values are found for each
possible combinations of the 0/1 values of the durable good ownership. As the model is solved for 5 periods,
there are 25 = 32 such combinations. Based on these solutions, I define the optimal set of durable good
ownership. This process is repeated for 50 different values of .
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Value Remarks
δ 0.9375 from Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011)
H50 (∗) 1 health is measured on the 0-1 scale
ξ 0.955 chosen to H100 = 0.1
R 1.04 from Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011)
p 500 price of an average durable item (in GBP, based on
ELSA statistics on expenditures)
Y (∗) 3500 annual constant income to be spent on non-durable and durable goods
(in GBP, based on expenditure statistics)
W50 3500 value selected to equal one year’s income
γ 2 from Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011)
φ 1.167 from Ogaki and Reinhart (1998)
α1 (∗) 0.81 from Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011)
α2 (∗) 0.05 ad hoc, to allow utility weight of durables to decrease with health
α3 (∗) 0 utility weight of durables not affected by age
η (∗) 1 ad hoc, to capture direct utility from health
β (∗) 0.1 ad hoc, to allow weak but not negligible bequest motives
ω0 5 · 10−4 similar values in Strulik and Vollmer (2013)
ω1 (∗) 3.36 · 10−5 similar values for England and Wales in Strulik and Vollmer (2013)
ω2 ω1/3 ad hoc, to allow health to decrease baseline mortality
ω3 (∗) 0.095 similar values for England and Wales in Strulik and Vollmer (2013)
(∗): parameter values to be varied in the simulations of section 5.2 and Appendix C
Table 3: Baseline parameter values
The baseline model implies considerable investments in the durable goods at ages 60-90,
but the ownership ratio is much lower around the end of the possible lifetime. The high
fraction of individuals owning the durable good up to the age of 90 years resembles the
observed age patterns of television and washing machine ownership (Figure 1).
Extending the model with 5-year frequency of purchase decisions does not qualitatively
change the implications of the baseline specification. Under this extension, the fraction of
individuals owning the durable good is above 75% up to age 85. It then quickly decreases
to 42, 8, and 0% at age 90, 95, and 100, respectively. To save computational time, in the
following section, I base the results on the assumption of 10-year decision frequency.
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Baseline
Age model solution
60 0.92
70 0.84
80 0.86
90 0.90
100 0.28
Table 4: Baseline model solution: fraction of individuals owning the durable good
5.2 Simulations
In the following, I analyse the effects of discounting, health, longevity and preference param-
eters on the age pattern of durable good ownership. Appendix C presents further simulation
results related to the influence of bequest motives and retirement.
5.2.1 Partial effect of discounting
Using the model of section 5.1, I will analyse the partial effect of discounting on the demand
for durables. The results presented in Table 4 show the total effect of ageing, including the
discounting of later utilities, deteriorating health and decreasing survival probability.
To arrive at the partial effect of discounting, I solve the same optimisation problem as
in section 5.1 with the difference that health is now constant (ξ=1) and the probability of
survival to any age equals the probability of survival to age 51 (at age 50). Hence, apart from
a risk in one-year survival, there is no mortality risk in this specification. The age pattern
of durable good ownership under this specification is solely due to the effect of discounting
and the existence of small bequest motives. It is not due to health, survival probability or
preferences changing with age.9 The results are presented in Table 5. In conclusion, these
9I keep bequest motives in this specification to ensure the optimisation process is feasible. Having no
bequest motives would imply corner solution at the last period.
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results can be compared to the age effects estimated from the data and presented in Figure
4, which are cleaned from the effect of health, survival probability and other observable
characteristics.
If, in addition to the elimination of the effect of health and uncertain survival, the discount
factor is set to one (δ=1), then as Table 5 shows, there is no longer a drop in the ownership
ratio at the oldest ages. Hence, the age pattern of the demand for the durable good is
roughly flat.
Age δ=0.9375 δ=1
60 0.80 0.84
70 0.82 0.78
80 0.82 0.84
90 0.82 0.86
100 0.68 0.84
Table 5: Partial effect of discounting: fraction of individuals owning the durable good
The simulated effect of ageing is smaller if health and survival probability are kept con-
stant. This is in line with the empirical results that the partial effect of age on durable good
ownership (Figure 4) is smaller than the raw age differences in ownership (Figure 1). The
simulated effect of discounting on ownership is flat up to the oldest possible age when it
declines, but to a lesser extent than under the baseline specification. Thus, the big drop in
ownership at the oldest ages under the baseline is due to declining health and small survival
probability up to those ages. Assuming constant health and no risk of mortality, it is optimal
to own the durable good at the oldest ages with the highest probability.
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5.2.2 Influence of health
Next, I will analyse the sensitivity of the results to the health-related parameters. I modify
the baseline set of parameters in a stepwise fashion and the results are presented in Table 6.
As the first step, the initial level of health is reduced to 0.5, instead of 1. This modification
implies that the fraction of individuals possessing the durable good increases slightly at ages
70 and 80, but at the oldest ages the fraction is somewhat lower than under the baseline
specification (with better initial health). This difference is reasonable because, with worse
health the survival probabilities are also lower, implying that the expected utility derived
from the durable good at the oldest ages is also lower. Setting the direct effect of health on
utility to zero (η = 0) implies that a slightly higher fraction of individuals own the durable
good at ages 70 and 80.
One reason for this change can be that under this modified specification the durable good
(and the non-durable good, as well) has a stronger relative impact on the utility levels than
before, implying higher demand. Setting α2 = 0 has even bigger effects. If the utility weight
of the durable good is constant, instead of increasing with declining health then the fraction
of individuals possessing the durable good is roughly constant up to the oldest ages, then
there is no longer a peak around the age of 80 as seen in the previous specification.
Age α2=0.05, η=1, H50=0.5 α2=0.05, η=0, H50=0.5 α2=0, η=0, H50=0.5
60 0.92 0.92 0.92
70 0.86 0.88 0.90
80 0.92 0.98 0.90
90 0.90 0.88 0.90
100 0.22 0.18 0.30
Table 6: The influence of health and health related parameters: fraction of individuals
owning the durable good
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5.2.3 Effect of longevity on two types of durable goods
The life-cycle model can also be used to analyse the effect of changing longevity on the
demand for durable goods. Due to inherent endogeneity in measures of subjective longevity,
this effect is difficult to identify empirically. I analyse the effect on two types of durable
goods, a ”television-type” and a ”computer-type” good. The use of the two goods requires
different levels of technical knowledge and hence different health levels. Therefore, the age
effects are expected to be different, as the figures of sections 3 and 4 also indicate. I then
modify the baseline model so as to represent the demand for these two types of goods, but as
a simplification, I still neglect the possible interactions between the demand for the different
durable items.
I simulate the effect of increasing longevity of a similar magnitude as the longevity in-
creased between the first and last quarter of the 20th century in Great Britain. The historical
parameters of the survival model are taken from Strulik and Vollmer (2013). I run simula-
tions with the original (current) parameters, and the historical ones, where ω1 = 2.35 · 10−4
and ω3 = 0.0795. The original and the lower probabilities of survival, conditional on living
up to age 50, are presented in Figure 6.
In the first simulation, I analyse the effect of increasing survival probability on the demand
for a ”television-type” good. The utility weight of this good increases with age and decreases
with health. The assumption here is that with ageing and deteriorating health, more time
is spent at home, which increases the utility derived from having a television at home. The
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Figure 6: Survival probabilities conditional on living up to age 50
utility weight of the non-durable good is αt, while of the durable good it is 1− αt where
α10t = max
(
0,min
(
1, 0.8 + 0.15H210t − 2.25 · 10−4 (10t)2 + 0.1
))
. (8)
As before, t runs between 1 and 5, and  is a standard normal random variable. The
parameters are selected in such a way that the average utility weight of the non-durables at
age 60 is similar as before (equation 5c), which is around 0.82. It then decreases to around
0.24 by the end of the possible lifetime. The rest of the parameters are the same as under
the baseline specification.
Table 7 shows the simulation results. Compared to the baseline results (Table 4), the
probability of holding the durable good is higher at older ages; that is, it is 1 from age 70 on.
The increasing probability of owning the durable good resembles the age-pattern of television
ownership (Figure 1), although the observed ownership rate increases monotonically between
ages 50 and 90. The simulations also show that higher chances of survival imply higher
demand for the good at the oldest ages.
In the second simulation, I look at a ”computer-type” good. The utility weight of this
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type of durable good increases with health and decreases with age. The reasons for this
assumption are that mental or physical health problems might limit the capabilities of older
individuals to use computers (Pew Research Center (2014), Rosenberg et al. (2009)), while
older people might be less capable to learn new and fast changing technologies. The utility
weight of the non-durable good is now specified as
α10t = max
(
0,min
(
1, 0.835− 0.1H210t + 0.9 · 10−4 (10t)2 + 0.1
))
. (9)
In this specification, at age 60 α has a slightly lower average value than in the baseline
(around 0.8), where it approaches 1 at the oldest ages.
The simulation results are presented in the second part of Table 7. Compared to the
baseline, it is optimal to hold the ”computer-type” durable good with a higher probability
around age 60; the demand for this type of durable good then drops. This age pattern is
reasonable as the utility weight of the durable good is assumed to decrease steeply with
age. Re-optimising the model with lower survival probabilities has negative effect on the
ownership ratio, the influence of survival probability is bigger than on the ”television-type”
good. This effect is close to zero at the oldest ages. As the ownership ratio of the durable
good at those ages was already close to zero, there is little scope for further decline. However,
if together with increasing life expectancy the understanding of the ”computer-type” good
also increases at older ages (hence αt increases less with t), then increasing longevity would
imply even higher demand for the good at older ages.
It follows from this discussion that the effect of increasing longevity on the demand
for durable goods is not trivial. The fraction of individuals owning the durable good at
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TV PC
Original survival Lower survival Original survival Lower survival
Age probability probability probability probability
60 0.74 0.88 1.00 0.94
70 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.68
80 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.48
90 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.06
100 1.00 0.88 0.02 0.00
Table 7: Effect of longevity on the demand of ”television-type” and ”computer-type” durable
goods: fraction of individuals owning the durable good
old ages becomes higher, but the magnitude of this increase strongly depends on how the
preference parameters change with age. The effect of longevity at the oldest ages is smaller
on such a good, which is more attractive to younger individuals mostly due to the required
advanced technological knowledge. On the other hand, the effect of longevity at younger
ages is smaller on goods for which the demand is so high that ownership is optimal even if
the survival probabilities are lower.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyse both empirically and theoretically how ageing is related to the
demand for three representative types of non-housing durable goods; namely, televisions,
washing machines and computers. The empirical analysis is based on ELSA, an English
panel data set covering individuals aged 50 and above. Although durable good ownership
and purchases can be related empirically to age, cohort and subjective survival probability,
such an analysis cannot reveal the influencing mechanisms of ageing. Furthermore , ageing
can be conceptualised in multiple ways: analysing the effect of approaching the end of
possible lifetime, changing chances of survival and deteriorating health can all be considered
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as aspects of the ageing process. These are then jointly reflected in the age gradient of
durable good demand. The theoretical model and simulations presented have thus aimed to
capture these complex relations in a simplified manner.
The age pattern of observed durable good ownership and purchases is considerably dif-
ferent from the age pattern once time and cohort effects and the influence of other individual
characteristics are taken into account. The strongest residual relations can be seen for com-
puter ownership and purchases, which are higher at younger ages and among people with
higher subjective chances of survival.
The life-cycle model presented in the paper is novel in terms of capturing the binary
nature of ownership decision and accounting for the substitutions with non-durable con-
sumption, uncertain lifetime, the influence of health and bequest motives at the same time.
The baseline solution of the model indicates that the durable good ownership rate drops
at the oldest ages. Simulations indicate that when holding health and survival probability
constant, the age pattern of durable good ownership is close to being flat. Higher chances of
survival increase the ownership ratio of the durable items. However, the magnitude of the
effects depends on the preference parameter assumptions. Hence, structural estimation of
the preference parameters is hindered not only by data limitations, but also by the fact that
a sufficiently realistic model of durable goods demand cannot be solved analytically.
Overall, descriptive empirical analysis suggests a hump-shaped age pattern of durable
good ownership above the age of 50 years. The results of the theoretical model resemble
this hump-shaped pattern if the effect of retirement is taken into account. This pattern is
the result of complex relations, including cohort effects and changing preferences with age.
Strong bequest motives might eliminate the hump-shaped pattern. Moreover, different types
31
of durable goods have different age gradients, as the utility derived from their possession
varies differently with age. When considering the effect of ageing on durable goods demand,
one should keep in mind that ageing has multiple aspects, including deteriorating health
and changing consumption preferences. Goods that are leisure complements can increase
well-being in old age groups, a trend which is suggested by the observed aged patterns of
ownership rates. They can be rationalised with a theoretical model that allows for changing
preference parameters.
The results of the paper suggest that increasing longevity raises the demand for durable
goods at older ages, implying higher demand for such non-housing durable goods in an
ageing society. This increasing demand might be partly offset by increasing the retirement
age, especially in the case of such goods which have a higher use value if the available leisure
time increases.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Results for other categories of durable goods
Below, I present empirical results for those types of durable goods that are not analysed in
the main text. Here I only focus on ownership, as purchases decline with age for all the
goods.
First, Figure 7 displays the observed aged pattern of ownership. Apart from fridge
freezers/deep freezers and microwave ovens, ownership declines with age, at least starting
from around age 70. Although some of the age patterns are steep, these are not as steep
as are observed for computers. Many of these goods represent relatively new technologies
(e.g. DVD players, online-digital televisions) and can be considered as ”luxury” goods, thus
the decreasing demand with age is not surprising. The different age patterns of freezers
and microwave ovens are also reasonable along the same lines. These require little technical
knowledge, as good physical or mental health are not prerequisites for their use and can be
considered as essential electrical appliances.
Second, Figure 8 shows the partial effect of age on the ownership of the durable goods.
These results are obtained in the same way as the results of Figure 4. Conditional on 10-year
cohort, survey wave, region effects and individual characteristics, most of the marginal effects
are statistically insignificant and quantitatively small. Some positive effects at the oldest
ages can be observed on the ownership of freezers and microwave ovens, and negative on DVD
players and online-digital TVs. These results suggest that in itself age has a moderate effect
on the ownership probabilities of the non-housing durable goods, but the marginal effects
of the highest ages tend to be negative on more technically advanced goods and positive on
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goods that require little technical knowledge and are essential household items.
Appendix B: Two period model
I present here the simplest possible two-period model, which is analytically solvable, but can
still capture some of the mechanisms driving the results of section 5.1. As much as possible,
this simplified model follows the logic and notation of the baseline model.
There are two periods. Utility depends on non-durable consumption and durable good
ownership (which is 0 or 1). The durable good depreciates completely from period 1 to 2;
thus it needs to be replaced if the decision maker wishes to own the good in the second
period. The survival probability to the second period is s. There are no bequest motives
and hence wealth is depleted in the second period. Unless otherwise stated, the notations
are the same as in section 5.1.
The maximisation problem is as follows:
maxu(C1, D1) + δsu(C2, D2), (10)
Subject to the following constraints:
C2 = RW1 + Y − pD2, (11)
W1 = RW0 + Y − pD1 − C1. (12)
Initial wealth, income and survival probability (W0, Y, s) are exogeneous here. To keep
the model tractable, I also assume that the first period consumption (C1) is exogenous -
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Figure 7: Durable good ownership ratio by age: local polynomial estimator and 95% confi-
dence interval
38
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
cd player
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
dvd player
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
video recorder
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
online−digital/satellite/cable tv
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
freezer
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
dishwasher
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
washer−dryer
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
60.age 70.age 80.age 90.age
age dummies
microwave oven
Figure 8: Average marginal effect and 95% confidence interval of age on durable good own-
ership
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this can correspond to the usual value of non-durable consumption. With this assumption,
there are only two decision variables: D1 and D2. Utility is specified as a linear function of
non-durable consumption and durable good ownership:
u(C,D) = (β0 + β1I(t = 2))C + (1− β0 − β1I(t = 2))D, (13)
where β1 parameter captures age effect, a positive value implying that the utility weight of
the durable good decreases with age.
Due to the linearity and exogeneity assumptions, the optimisation simplifies to the com-
parison of four utility levels (normalised to the first utility level being equal to 0):
1. U(D1 = 0, D2 = 0) = 0.
2. U(D1 = 1, D2 = 0) = 1− β0 + δs(β0 + β1)(−Rp).
3. U(D1 = 0, D2 = 1) = δs((β0 + β1)(−p) + (1− β0 − β1)).
4. U(D1 = 1, D2 = 1) = 1− β0 + δs((β0 + β1)(−p−Rp) + (1− β0 − β1)).
These results imply, among others, that D1 = 0, D2 = 1 is more likely to be preferable
over D1 = 0, D2 = 0 and similarly, D1 = 1, D2 = 1 over D1 = 1, D2 = 0 if the price of the
durable good is smaller, if the baseline utility weight of the non-durable good (β0) is smaller,
and if the utility weight of the durable good increases with age (β1 < 0). Furthermore,
increasing durable good ownership (D1 = 0, D2 = 1) is more likely than decreasing ownership
(D1 = 1, D2 = 0) if the survival probability (s) and discount factor (δ) are higher, and if β0
and β1 < 0 are smaller.
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These implications of the two period model are in line with the simulation results of the
multiple period, extended model.
Appendix C: Further simulation results
Appendix C1: Influence of bequest motives
The parameter capturing the strength of bequest motives was selected in the baseline spec-
ification in an ad hoc fashion. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how sensitive the
model’s predictions are to this parameter.
An important assumption throughout the paper is that durable goods are not bequeath-
able or have no value for the successors. Otherwise, the ownership ratio of durable goods
would be higher, especially at the oldest ages. In the baseline specification the parameter
capturing the strength of bequest motives was set to β = 0.1. Here, I first solve the optimi-
sation problem with β = 1 (strong bequest motives), then I solve the model with the original
β parameter, but allowing the durable good to be bequeathable. The utility of bequests now
equals
v (W10t) = β
(W10t + pD10t)
1−γ
1− γ . (14)
The results are displayed in Table 8. Under strong bequest motives the demand for the
durable good is lower than under the baseline specification. This is reasonable, as the
decision-maker wishes to decumulate her wealth to a lesser extent to ensure that she can
leave bequest. This simulation indicates that the strength of the bequest motives has a
relatively strong influence on the demand for the durable good.
If the durable good is bequeathable, then the probability of holding the durable good is
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close to one at each period. This probability would be lower if, in equation (14), the nominal
value of the durable good were to have a lower weight in the utility of bequest than the
remaining financial wealth.
Age Strong bequest motives (β = 1) Bequeathable durable good (β = 0.1)
60 0.84 0.86
70 0.84 0.90
80 0.74 0.98
90 0.62 0.90
100 0.02 1.00
Table 8: The influence of bequest motives: fraction of individuals owning the durable good
Appendix C2: Effect of retirement
The empirical results (Table 2) indicate no significant effect of retirement on the ownership
of durable items, but a statistically stronger positive effect of around 1% on the probability
of television and washing machine purchases. The estimates are insignificant if the transition
into retirement is used as a regressor. Although no immediate effect of retirement can be
observed, it is still possible that retirement influences the optimal ownership and purchases
of durable goods over the life-cycle. To analyse this effect, I run simulations with changing
income and changing preferences at retirement age.
I assume that the decision maker retires at age 65. First, I replace the constant income
with an annual income value of 4, 077 between ages 50-65, and 2, 446 between ages 66-100.
These income values were selected, such that the pension replacement rate is 60%, and
the discounted sum of income is the same as under the baseline specification. Second, I
assume not only that income drops at age 65, but also that the utility weight of the durable
good increases at the same time. This assumption can be especially reasonable for leisure
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goods (television-type durable goods). Under this specification, α1 = 0.9 for ages 50-65,
and α1 = 0.76 for ages above 65 (the weighted average equals the baseline value of 0.81).
Again, the model is solved with the assumption that investment decisions are only made
every 10 years, while in the other years, consumption equals income. The simulation results
are presented in Table 9.
Age Income drops at retirement Income drops and preferences change at retirement
60 0.86 0.56
70 0.88 0.64
80 0.92 0.98
90 0.78 0.90
100 0.20 0.30
Table 9: The influence of retirement: fraction of individuals owning the durable good
Compared to the baseline specification, a drop in income at age 65 implies higher owner-
ship ratio at ages 70 and 80 than under the baseline. The demand for the durable good does
not drop when income drops, which is in line with consumption smoothing. The slightly
higher demand at ages 70 and 80 is reasonable. Although the present value of the income
flow is the same as before, if lifetime uncertainty is taken into account, then the expected
present value of the future income flow is higher here. The income level is higher until age 65
when the survival probability is high, while it is lower above age 65 when the chances of sur-
vival are also lower. The higher initial income, together with the non-negativity constraint
on wealth, also enable higher expenditures.
If the utility weight of the durable good increases with retirement, then there is a peak
in the durable ownership ratio around the age of 80. The increasing pattern of ownership
above age 50 and below the age of 90 resembles the observed age pattern of television and
washing machine ownership.
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